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BLD-133        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1119 
 ___________ 
 
 DANIEL TILLI, 
    Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
MANORCARE HEALTH SERVICES; PATRICIA STAHR;  
MR. GNANAPRAKASH GOPAL; HEARTLAND HOSPICE 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 5-10-cv-06887) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 10, 2011 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, Jr., Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: March 23, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Daniel Tilli appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  We will affirm. 
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 Tilli alleges that the defendants caused the death of Marie Rose Altieri, whom he 
refers to as his “loved one,” by failing to provide her with medication, food and water 
while she was staying in a hospice nursing home.  In his pro se complaint, he invoked 
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and claimed that defendants violated 
his and Mrs. Altieri’s rights under the Eighth Amendment and the “Persons With 
Disabilities Act,” by which he appears to have meant the Americans With Disabilities 
Act.  As relief, he sought monetary damages for the benefit of Mrs. Altieri’s 
grandchildren.  The District Court raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua 
sponte and directed Tilli to brief it.  Tilli repeated his allegations in his brief, and also 
asserted that the District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  The 
District Court rejected Tilli’s arguments and dismissed his complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction by order entered December 20, 2010.   
Tilli appeals.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and “[w]e 
review a district court’s determination of its own subject matter jurisdiction de novo.”  
Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 110 (3d Cir. 2010).1
                                                 
1 The day before Tilli filed his notice of appeal, he filed a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the District 
Court denied.  Tilli did not file a second or amended notice of appeal, so the District 
  The District Court properly raised 
the issue of its subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, and we agree that it lacked 
jurisdiction for the reasons it already has adequately explained.  In particular, the District 
Court properly concluded that Tilli had not stated any colorable federal claim, see 
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Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 & n.10 (2006), and had not shown complete 
diversity of the parties.  Tilli raised nothing in his jurisdictional response suggesting that 
he could cure these defects by amending his complaint.2
On appeal, Tilli relies on the United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in 
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011), that the plaintiff 
stated a Title VII claim on the basis of retaliation for the protected conduct of his fiancée.  
Tilli has not asserted anything resembling a Title VII claim.  Tilli also argues that the 
District Judge was biased against pro se litigants and improperly referred to two of his 
previous lawsuits.  But Tilli himself attached the docket sheets for those suits to his 
complaint, and the District Court referenced them merely by way of construing his pro se 
filing.  There is no basis for Tilli’s allegation of bias.   
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Court’s denial of his Rule 59(e) motion is not before us.  See Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
2 In his Rule 59(e) motion, Tilli asserted that the (previously unnamed) Chief 
Executive Officer of Manorcare Health Services is the “real” defendant and that he 
had named Pennsylvania resident employees “in error.”  We cannot consider 
arguments raised for the first time in Tilli’s Rule 59(e) motion because he did not 
appeal its denial.  See Carrascosa , 520 F.3d at 253-54 
